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Purpose 
The field of research on resource based competition is full of nuanced terminology and misunderstandings 
(Lockett et al., 2009). This has led to confusion thus we offer a critical review, which provides a structure and 
clarity to this subject.  
Design/Methodology 
This analysis structures the literature on resources, capabilities, and competences into three distinct schools of 
thought: (1) the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), the rational-equilibrium school; (2) the dynamic 
capability-based view of the firm, the behavioural-evolutionary school; and (3) the competence-based view of 
the firm, the social constructionist school. 
Findings 
We uncover thirteen criticisms of the most widely adopted theoretical framework of the RBV of the firm- VRIO 
-Valuable-Rare-Imperfectly imitable- Organisation- (Barney and Clark (2007).  
Research Limitations/implications 
The misinterpretation and neglect of the classic scholary work (e.g., Penrose (1959) and Dierickx and Cool 
(1989a)) may help to explain why the VRIO framework has been elevated from a view to a theory and why it 
has receievd so much attention. 
Practical implications 
We show how the relative ease of measuring resources as compared to (dynamic) capabilities and (core) 
competencies has helped raise the profile of RBV. 
Social implications 
The “management-fashion-setting process” may explain why RBV has been elevated from a view to theory 
(Abrahamson, 1996). 
Originality/value 
This analysis contributes to management research by illustrating the deviation among the three schools of 
thought; we show how this has contributed to wide terminological confusion and offer a structure to help 
researchers situate their work within the relevant school of thought. 
Introduction 
Why do some firms persistently outperform others? To answer this central question, two 
competing paradigms dominate strategic management thinking: the External Factors 
Paradigm; and the Internal Factors Paradigm. The former appears to share the view that 
rents flow from privileged product market positions (the exploitation of market power). As a 
result, approaches in this paradigm (e.g., the competitive forces approach developed by Porter 
(1980)1) tend to focus on product market imperfections, entry deterrence, and strategic 
interaction. The latter, also known as the resource-based view of the (henceforth the RBV), 
contends that the main sources of competitive advantage are proactively created and 
maintained by firms through acquiring and/or accumulating their strategic resources. As a 
result, the central question actually now becomes: Of all the resources currently controlled by 
a firm, which are most likely to be a source of competitive advantage (Barney and Clark, 
2007; Black and Boal, 1994; Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Hunt and Derozier, 2004; Priem 
and Butler, 2001a; Teece et al., 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
The resource-based view of the firm is a stream of research that also encompasses several 
important explanations of persistent performance differences, namely that of the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991, 1995; Barney and Clark, 2007; Wernerfelt, 
1984), the dynamic capability (DC) based view of the firm (e.g., Teece, et al., 1997; Winter, 
2003), and the (core) competence-based view (CBV) of the firm (e.g., Hamel and Heene, 
1994; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Sanchez and Heene, 2004; Sanchez and Heene, 1997b; 
Sanchez et al., 1996b).  
The field of research on resource based competition is full of nuanced terminology and 
misunderstandings. Of course, this partly reflects the intense interest and lively debate within 
the management research community, but it does nonetheless present difficulties for scholars 
attempting to begin research in the field. Furthermore, we also recognise that within this 
paradigm there exists a dominant theoretical framework- VIRO that deserves attention. Our 
intention is not to provide an exhaustive interpretation of all papers that have been written 
about the RBV; rather, the purpose of this paper is to advance our understanding of this 
stream of research by structuring the literature into three distinct schools of thought and to 
use this as a lens to critically discuss the most widely adopted theoretical framework in this 
line of research, the VIRO.  This analysis contributes to management research by illustrating 
the deviation among the three schools of thought and this helps to explain some of the 
criticisms that have emerged. We show how this has contributed to wide terminological 
confusion and offer a structure to help researchers situate their work within the relevant 
school of thought. Significantly, this paper contributes to the debate on fundamental 
conceptual and theoretical criticisms of VRIO (Sanchez, 2008) and argue that it does not 
adequately address the notion of resource-based competition, and its claim to be a general 
view of resources is unwarranted theoretically and unsupported empirically. 
The resource-based Views : One paradigm, but three schools of thought 
The resource-based view of the firm is a line of research that also encompasses several 
important explanations of persistent performance differences, namely that of the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991, 1995; Barney and Clark, 2007; Wernerfelt, 
1984), the dynamic capability (DC) based view of the firm (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; 
e.g., Teece, et al., 1997; Wang and Ahmed, 2007; Winter, 2003) and the (core) competence-
based view (CBV) of the firm (e.g., Hamel and Heene, 1994; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Sanchez and Heene, 2004; Sanchez and Heene, 1997b; Sanchez, et al., 1996b).  
Some scholars consider the three views to be one school of thought that share the same 
underlying theoretical structure. For example, Barney and Clark (2007) suggest that there 
seems to be a battle of the label of this common theoretical framework. They go on to argue 
that while these theories have a slightly different way of characterizing firm attributes they 
share the same underlying theoretical structure. They state that: 
In this sense, resource-based theory is not really about resources, per se, but about the 
attributes that resources must possess if they are to be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage.  [emphasis added] (Barney and Clark, 2007: 249-250). 
In this context, Newbert (2007) classifies this line of research into: (1) the “early incarnations 
of the RBV” (e.g., Barney, 1991); and (2) the “more contemporary theoretical extensions” 
(e.g., Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece, et al., 1997). 
Others consider these views to be two distinct schools of thought. For example, Makadok 
(2001) identifies two rent creation mechanisms: (1) the “resource-picking mechanism” which 
adopts the “Ricardian perspective”, and has been codified into  “a resource-based view” (e.g., 
Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984); and the “capability-building mechanism” which adopts the 
“Schumpeterian perspective”, and has been codified into “a dynamic-capability view” (e.g., 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989a; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, et al., 1997). He argues that, in 
some cases, these two mechanisms “complement each other”; in other cases however, they 
“substitute each other”. 
The others consider these views to be three distinct schools of thought. Seoudi (2009) is an 
interesting example. Based on a “thorough analysis” of the underlying philosophical and 
epistemological foundations and the fundamental assumptions employed by the key scholars 
of the resource-, dynamic capability-, and competence-based views, she classifies this line of 
research into three schools: “the rational-equilibrium school (the RBV); behavioral-
evolutionary school (the DC); and the social constructionist school (the CBV)”. She argues 
that although each school represents a “unique frame of lens”, some authors equate the RBV 
with all three schools. In addition, very often, scholars consider the dynamic capability- and 
competence-based views to be “one research program while attributing the differences to 
mere semantic preferences and a proliferation of terms that in many cases refer to the same 
phenomena”. Though, they are “three distinct schools, which exhibit some similarities, but 
also house non-trivial differences”.  
In this paper, we adopt the position that these three views are three distinct schools of 
thoughts. Table 1 outlines a metatheoretical scheme for classifying the major schools of 
thought within the resource-based paradigm. We use this classification to address the notion 
of resource based competition and examine the most widely adopted theoretical framework in 
this stream of research- the VRIO framework. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The RBV of the firm and the VRIO framework 
The RBV of the firm is one of the most widely accepted views within strategic management, 
and “the number of proponents who have elevated it from the status of ‘view to theory’ is 
growing” (Priem and Butler, 2001a; Sanchez, 2008). It does not only serve as “a major 
theoretical foundation in the scholarly literature . . . , but, it is also prominently featured in all 
major textbooks on the subject of strategic management, research, teaching, and consulting 
agendas” (Newbert, 2007). Furthermore, a number of significant studies (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, (1984) Wernerfelt, 1984;3 Barney, 1986;4 Barney, (1991) Rumelt, 
(1991) and Barney, (1995), among others) have developed the foundation of what has 
become known as the resource-based theory (RBT) of the firm. Table 2 summarizes the 
foundational building blocks of this body of theory. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
A theoretical framework 
The work of Barney (1991, 1995), Barney and Arikan (2001), and Barney and Clark (2007) 
provide a theoretical framework of the RBV of the firm. This has four key elements: i) 
assumptions; ii) firm resources; iii) attributes of strategic resources; and iv) the path to 
sustained competitive advantage. 
i) Assumptions 
Barney argues that, in order to understand the sources of sustained competitive advantage, the 
model should begin with two assumptions: firm resources may be heterogeneous and 
immobile. In the former, “building on Penrose [(1959)]’s work, this work assumes that firms 
can be thought of as bundles of productive resources, and that different firms possess 
different bundles of these resources”. In the latter, “drawing on the work of Selznick and 
Ricardo, this approach assumes that some of these resources are either very costly to copy or 
inelastic in supply” (Barney, 2007: 133). These assumptions contrast with the earlier theories 
of the firm that view it as a homogeneous bundle of tangible productive resources that lies 
outside the firm.  
ii) Firm resources 
According to the RBV, a firm is an integrated set of tangible and intangible resources 
controlled by the firm that enables it to conceive of and implement strategies designed to 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Here, the tangibility of firm resources is a matter of 
degree. Resources that are typically more tangible include, but are not limited to, financial 
capital resources: e.g., equity capital, and debt capital; and physical capital resources: e.g., 
the geographic location, plants and equipment, and the physical technology. Resources that 
are typically less tangible include, but are not limited to, human capital resources: e.g., 
training, experience, judgment, intelligence, and insights of single individuals; and 
organizational capital resources: e.g., firm’s cultural, its formal reporting structure, formal 
and informal planning, controlling and coordinating systems, and informal relations among 
groups within the firm and between the firm and those in its environment (Barney and Clark, 
2007). 
iii) Attributes of strategic resources 
Barney and Clark (2007) argue that since different types of resources can have different 
competitive effects for firms, not all firm resources hold the potential of sustained 
competitive advantage. In this respect, to have this potential, a firm resource must have four 
attributes: valuable (V), rare (R), imperfectly imitable (I), and organization (O), known as the 
VRIO framework. Here is their argument. 
First, it must be valuable. A valuable resource enables a firm to implement a strategy that has 
the effect of exploiting environmental opportunities or neutralizing threats by: (a) lowering 
the firm’s net cost and/or increasing the firm’s net revenues beyond would have been the case 
if this valuable resource had not been used; and/or (b) increasing the willingness of its 
customers to pay5. Exploiting this valuable resource increases the economic value the firm 
creates (Barney, 1991; Barney and Arikan, 2001; Barney and Clark, 2007).  
Second, it must be rare. The rare resource is not simultaneously possessed by large numbers 
of other current or potential rivals. This may be due to the physical rareness in the strategic 
factor market (SFM) and/or rivals cannot perceive its value due to the firm’s particular 
resource combination (Barney, 1991; Barney and Arikan, 2001; Barney and Clark, 2007).  
Third, it must be imperfectly imitable. An imperfectly imitable resource is a firm’s resource 
that competitors cannot directly duplicate. In other words, competitors without this resource 
face a “cost disadvantage” in acquiring or developing it. In this respect, a resource can be 
imperfectly imitable for one or a combination of three reasons: (1) accumulating this resource 
is dependent upon unique historical conditions (history-based or path-dependent); (2) it is 
socially complex; and/or (3) the link between this resource and the firm’s superior 
performance is causally ambiguous. Here, the causally ambiguous relationship may be due to 
one or more of the following reasons: (a) resources and capabilities are “taken-for-granted” 
organizational characteristics or “invisible assets”; (b) managers are unable to evaluate which 
of their resources and capabilities, alone or in combination, actually create the sustained 
competitive advantage; and/or (c) these resources and capabilities may follow the notion of 
interconnectedness and asset mass efficiencies introduced by Dierickx and Cool (1989a). 
However, the previous three reasons work under the “nonsubstitutability” assumption which 
means that firms, which cannot imitate the valuable and rare resource, cannot use different 
resource to implement the same strategy (Barney, 1991; Barney and Arikan, 2001; Barney 
and Clark, 2007). 
Fourth, there must be organizational processes (“complementary resources and capabilities”, 
such as formal reporting structure, management control systems, and compensation policies) 
organized to exploit the full competitive potential of these strategic (valuable, rare, 
inimitable) resources and capabilities. This is because neither the strategic resources and 
capabilities are likely to be a source of sustained competitive advantage by themselves, nor 
will the complementary resources and capabilities have the ability to generate sustained 
competitive advantage in isolation. Organizational processes, then, provide the fourth 
condition necessary for realizing sustained competitive advantage. In this theoretical model, 
the complementary resources and capabilities operate as an “adjustment factor” [emphasis 
added] (Barney, 1995; Barney and Arikan, 2001; Barney and Clark, 2007). 
iv) The path to competitive position 
Competitive advantage (CA) is defined as follows:  
An enterprise has a Competitive Advantage if it is able to create more economic value than the marginal 
(breakeven) competitor in its product market… [In this respect,] the Economic Value created by an 
enterprise in the course of providing a good or service is the difference between the perceived benefits 
gained by the purchasers of the good and the economic cost to the enterprise. (Peteraf and Barney, 2003: 
314) 
For example, if the customers’ maximum willingness-to-pay for a product/service is 
£230/unit, and the total economic cost for this product/service is £50/unit, then the economic 
value created by the firm is (£230-£50) £180/unit (Barney, 2007; Peteraf and Barney, 2003). 
Figure 1 is an illustrative example for the basic components of CA. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Considering the competitive position, three types of competitive advantage are identified: 
competitive disadvantage (CD); competitive parity (CP); and CA. First, the CD represents a 
situation in which “a firm creates less economic value than its rivals”. In this respect, a 
sustained competitive disadvantage (SCD) indicates a CD that lasts a long time, and a 
temporary competitive disadvantage (TCD) indicates a CD that lasts a short time. Second, the 
CP represents a situation in which “a firm creates the same economic value as its rivals”. 
Third, the CA represents a situation in which “a firm creates more economic value than its 
rivals”. In this respect, a temporary competitive advantage (TCA) indicates a CA that lasts a 
short time , and a sustained competitive advantage (SCA) indicates a CA that lasts a long 
time (Barney, 2007). Figure 2 shows the different types of competitive positions. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
To this end, the theoretical model shows the characteristics of strategic resources and 
capabilities (as strategy inputs) and the different competitive advantages (as strategy 
objectives or outcomes). But, what about the different routes to CA? Four paths to CA have 
been identified as follows (Barney, 1991, 1995, 2007; Barney and Arikan, 2001; Barney and 
Clark, 2007; Barney and Wright, 1998):  
First, a firm that exploits a worthless or irrelevant resource or capability (weakness) will not 
be able to choose and/or implement strategies that exploit environmental opportunities or 
neutralize threats. “Organizing to exploit this resource will increase the firm’s costs or 
decrease its revenues”. This generates less economic value than its rivals’. This below-normal 
performance implies a CD (temporary or sustained depending on how long it would last).  
Second, a firm that exploits valuable but common resources when implementing a value 
creating strategy will create the same economic value as its rivals’. This normal performance 
implies a CP, which increases the firm’s probability of economic survival, but does not 
involve CA. 
Third, a firm that exploits valuable and rare but imitable resources when implementing value 
creating strategy will create more economic value than its rivals’. This above-normal 
performance implies a CA, or more precisely a TCA not SCA. That is because rivals will 
soon imitate the same strategy by acquiring the same resources to achieve the same position, 
resulting in CP. 
Finally, a firm that exploits valuable, rare, and inimitable resources when implementing 
value creating strategy will create more economic value than its rivals’. This above-normal 
performance implies a SCA. However, it is important here to mention to the 
nonsubstitutability assumption. If rivals cannot acquire the same resource, they will try to 
substitute it. In this respect, if a low number of rivals can substitute this resource to 
implement the same strategy, and this substitute is inimitable, then the focal firm will 
continue generating SCA. If, however, the substitute can be imitated, then the focal firm can 
generate a TCA that would be downgraded soon to CP when a large number of rivals imitate 
this substitute. Figure 3 depicts the VRIO framework of the RBV of the firm. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
This figure shows that, to implement a competitive strategy, a firm should efficiently and 
effectively organize business processes to exploit valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable
resources. By doing so, a large number of current and potential rivals cannot conceive of 
and/or implement the same strategy because of one or more of the three reasons stated under 
the inimitability attribute. Having shown an updated version of the RBV, we now turn to 
discuss the most critical criticisms of this strategic management view (or theory). 
VRIO: Thirteen criticisms 
Although the RBV is one of the most widely accepted theories within strategic management, 
it has also been the subject of significant criticism. There have been a few studies that have 
undertaken research to specifically examine whether the RBV framework satisfies key 
requirements for theoretical systems (e.g., Priem and Butler, (2001a, 2001b); Gibbert, 2006; 
Newbert et al., 2007; Sanchez, (2008)6; Kraaijenbrinket al., 2010). That is, the degree to 
which the RBV presently possesses the explanatory and predictive power generally 
associated with theories, and if it is eligible to become a theory of CA. In addition, over the 
past twenty years there has been a wealth of literature utilizing and examining the RBV. 
Within this wide body of work there have been many misrepresentations of some influential 
works in this line of research, namely that of Penrose (1959), in our analysis of the literature 
we have specifically, where appropriate, quoted from and provided the original source. 
We have analysed the literature for criticisms and have been able to identify thirteen separate 
reasons why the RBV does not adequately address the notion of resource-based competition. 
We have summarized these in Table 3. The remainder of this section systematically examines 
these criticisms. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
1. The value (V) conundrum (An exogenous black box) 
Sanchez (2008) argues that the VRIO framework fails to provide an adequate conceptual 
basis for identifying which organizational attributes (or “entities”) can be considered as 
valuable resources. It offers no ideas of its own to show how such valuable resources can be 
identified. It should be noted, however, that the RIO dimensions of the theoretical framework 
have been argued not as the characteristics of a resource to be valuable, but as characteristics 
for the valuable resource to be a possible source of competitive advantage. In this regard, the 
RBV suggests that the traditional SWOT analysis or environmental models of competitive 
advantage would reveal which of those attributes constitute valuable resources that would 
help a firm exploit opportunities or neutralize threats, and which do not. Therefore, it “relies 
on ‘outward in’ analysis based on unspecified SWOT frameworks or ‘environmental models’ 
from industry structrual analysis, [“notably those advanced by Porter (1980, 1985)”], to 
identify what constitutues a [valuable] firm resouce and what does not”. The SWOT analysis 
is itself an atheoretic mode of analysis that admits use of an unlimited range of approaches to 
analyzing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats—some of which may (and often 
do) lead to contradictory conclusions about what kinds of firm attributes constitute a strength 
or weakness, as well as what kinds of environmental situations constitute an opportunity or 
threat (Sanchez, 2008).  
To conclude, by “outsourcing” a basic conceptual task for the previous strategy models, the 
VRIO framework fails to provide a systematic, consistent, and generally applicable basis for 
identifying the firm attributes that qualify as strategically valuable, and which firm attributes 
do not (Sanchez, 2008). In other words, “. . . the criteria for value in the RBV remain, at 
present, in an exogenous black box” (Priem and Butler, 2001a), “the external determination 
of value construct” (Priem and Butler, 2001b). Therefore, given the resulting Value 
Conundrum, from a scientific perspective, “the core proposition of the RBV is shown to be 
unwarranted theoretically, as well as being unimplementable in practice” (Sanchez, 2008).  
2. The uniqueness or rare (R) dilemma 
In the VRIO framework, the R dimension means that a valuable resource should be rare
(scarce or uncommon) to be a source of temporary competitive advantage. Sanchez (2008) 
argues that the use of rarity as an attribute for a valuable resource to be qulaified for 
generating competitive advantage gives rise to what might be called the “Uniqueness 
Dilemma”. This occurs because firm resources are “heterogeneous” and thus at some level of 
analysis, all firm resources become unique, and thus rare. It is then logically impossible 
distinguish (even partially) resources that have the potential to be sources of competitive 
advantage from resources that do not. (Sanchez, 2008: 20). In other words, heterogeneity, as 
an assumption, eliminates the need for rarity, as an attribute.  
In a similar vein, Hoopes et al. (2003) make an attempt to develop “a broad theory of 
competitive heterogeneity” to address “the RBV’s inherent theoretical and empirical 
problems”. In this respect, while reviewing the RBV, they argue that, as heterogeneity means 
that each firm has a unique bundle of resources, “of these three characteristics [“valuable, 
rare, isolated from imitation or substitution”], only value and inimitability are ultimately 
important. . . . So concentrating on value and inimitability gets to the heart of the RBV”.  
Finally, Armstrong and Shimizu (2007) review 125 empirical RBV studies published in 8 
leading journals between 1991 and 2005 to examine the key methodological issues related to 
the RBV theoretical framework. They identify rarity as a “potentially important” 
methodological issue. Though, in their sample, rarity is “scarcely discussed or examined”. 
They therefore argue for theoretical modification or refinement of the RBV (Armstrong and 
Shimizu, 2007: 981-982). 
3. The cognitive impossibility dilemma (I) 
In the VRIO framework, the I dimension assumes that a high level of causal ambiguity is 
required to sustain the COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE. Barney and Clark (2007: 62) argue 
that “both the firms that possess resources that generate a competitive advantage and firms 
that do not possess these resources, but seek to imitate them, must be faced with the same 
level of causal ambiguity”. The argument here is that since some firm resources are tradable, 
competitors who know the resources that cause superior performance can buy or acquire 
these resources, and then imitate the same strategy. In other words, if managers are able to 
understand the relationship between the factor and the outcome, then this is sufficient to 
allow imitation or some other rapid response by rivals. This can be done through, for 
example, hiring “well-placed knowledgeable” managers in the superior performer, or 
engaging in a careful systematic study of this superior performer to reduce “knowledge 
disadvantage”. If the causal ambiguity is low, and managers can understand the antecedents 
of the superior success, the valuable and rare resource cannot be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage, unless it is socially complex, and beyond the ability of firms to 
systematically manage and influence. Organisational culture is a case in point; here, the 
ability of rivals to imitate this resource is “significantly constrained”. 
Sanchez (2008) criticizes this reasoning (both the high level of causal amiguity and/or social 
complexity), and argues that it clearly contradicts the core proposition of the RBV that 
managers can engage in “resource-based strategizing” to create sustained competitive 
advantage. He also states that if one accepts this reaseoning, s/he must also accept that 
strategy researchers cannot manage to identify these resources. Furthermore, under the RBV 
logic, if one accepts this reasoning, then “the only explanation for past or future success in 
creating sustainable competitive advantage would have to be a firm’s luck in acquiring or 
possessing such resources”.  
In this context, we need to distinguish between “know-what” and “know-how”. The 
assumption that published data and/or knowledge articulated by insiders about, for example, 
R&D capability, will “invoke rapid retaliatory responses by competitors . . . is overly 
simplistic”. Know-what does not imply that “firm’s competitors can duplicate or match the 
underlying inventive capability”. Although know-what may help competitors in accelerating 
the innovation process, they still face much difficulty in imitating this capability due to the 
attributes of the accumulation process. On the other hand, the ability of rivals to replicate a 
distinctive capability rests on know-how not know-what. In this respect, much of the know-
how knowledge cannot be articulated, and the distinctive capability that is based on this tacit 
knowledge cannot be transferred (Levitas and Chi, 2002). This line of reasoning is developed 
further by Reed and DeFillippi (1990) who argue that “where ambiguity is so great that 
managers do not understand intra-firm causal relationships, . . . it may be impossible to utilize 
competencies for advantage”. 
Empirical research on the “linkage ambiguity” also supports this criticism. That is, despite 
the imitation pressures, lower linkage ambiguity among top and middle managers of the focal 
firm is associated with higher firm performance. Managers of superior performers clearly 
understand the link between competences and performance. This is particularly important 
because such understanding enable them to exploit, enhance, and redeploy sources of 
success. On the other hand, managers of the inferior performers do not clearly understand the 
link between resource factors and performance (King and Zeithaml, 2001).   
4. The organization (O) dilemma 
The first version of the RBV, the VRIN framework, did not take into consideration the 
complementary resources and capabilities, the Organization (O) attribute. Due to a debate 
regarding the importance of such a type of resources in exploiting the VRI resources, the O
attribute has been added to the theoretical framework as an adjustment factor. 
For example, the RBV argues that if some firms possess a valuable resource and the 
complementary resources and capabilities required to take full advantage of this valuable 
resource, they are expected to generate CP. In this way, the RBV implicitly assumes that all
these firms will efficiently and effectively organize business processes, in the same way, to 
exploit this valuable resource, and, as such, will produce the same result: CP. This 
definitively goes against not only the other schools of thought, which Barney and Clark 
(2007) argue they share the same underlying theoretical structure, but also the RBV’s 
assumption that firm resources are heterogeneous, (including the complementary resources 
and capabilities, and as such the competitive outcome would be different). 
5. The tautology problems 
A concensus conceptualization of the characteristics of a theory is: “theories are 
systematically related sets of statements, including some law-like generalizations, that are 
empirically testable. The purpose of theory is to increase scientific understanding through a 
systematized structure capable of both explaining and predicting phenomena” (Hunt, 1983: 
10).  
Priem and Butler (2001a, 2001b) elaborate on the previous definition and examine if the 
fundamental statements in the VRIO framework (e.g., valuable and rare organizational 
resources can be a source of competitive advantage) meet the empirical content as a criterion 
that helps in separating “analytic statements” from “synthetic statements”. The former is true 
by definition, and, therefore, a confrontation with data is not required to determine their 
correctness. As such, they have no empirical content. The latter, however, is not true by 
definition, and a confrontation with the real world must determine their correctness. As such, 
they have empirical content. When they replace the terms of the fundamental statements of 
the VRIO framework with their definitions in the theory, they find that the fundamental 
statements are true by definition, “self-verifying”. Therefore, it is “not subject to 
disconfirmation”, “tautological” statement”. They conclude that: 
Thus, Barney's definitions indicate that additional conceptual work is needed if the foundation of the 
RBV is to meet the law-like generalization standard. . . . [That is,] the characteristics [“valuable and 
rarity”] and outcomes [“competitive advantage”] must be conceptualized independently to produce a 
synthetic statement. (Priem and Butler, 2001a: 28) 
Adopting a different view, Sanchez (2008) argues that the “tautology problem” in the 
identification of strategic resources is a fundamental problem of the VRIO framework that, 
due to the Value Conundrum, reduces “the RBV’s core proposition to an essentially 
tautological proposition”. He states that:  
Empirical ‘tests’ of the RBV’s core proposition commonly assert that resources identified ex post as 
being strategically valuable (by invoking some ad hoc environmental model or SWOT framework) were 
ipso facto the ex ante strategically valuable resources responsible for a firm’s or firms’ future success. 
(Sanchez, 2008: 14) 
To remedy this problem, researchers attempting to empirically test the core proposition of the 
RBV should identify, based on the characterization of what a valuable resource is, “ex ante 
the resources that will have strategic value ex post” (Sanchez, 2008). 
6. The static problem  
The tautology problem as illustrated previously by Sanchez (2008) leads to the static prolem, 
also known as the ex post or equilibrium-based analysis. Amit and Schoemaker (1993) and 
Seoudi (2009) argue that most empirical studies in the RBV try to examine a firm’s unique 
resources that explain some of the firm’s past performance. In this respect, this ex post
analysis may provide limited insight into the circumstances that will prevail in the future, 
taking into consideration the uncertainty about the economic and technological environments, 
competitors’ behavior, and customer preferences.  
Furthermore, Priem and Butler (2001a) state that “although the RBV began as a dynamic 
approach emphasizing change over time (e.g., Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), much of the subsequent literature has been static in concept”. It offers just 
“a static argument”. Though, “the static argument is descriptive: it identifies generic 
characteristics of rent-generating resources without much attention to differing situations or 
resource comparisons”. 
In other words, many authors argue that it does not adequately address the dynamic
competitive environments. This is because it involves applying “a timeless equilibrium model 
to an inherently dynamic reality” (Black and Boal, 1994; Foss, 1996: 181; Hunt, 2001).  
It should be noted, however, that such an equilibrium-based analysis was implicitly criticized 
a long time ago when discussing the “creative destruction” as the essence of “capitalism”. In 
his seminal work, Schumpeter (1994: 84)7 states that “the problem that is usually being 
visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is 
how it creates and destroys them”. It also has been criticized when discussing the self-
transformation as the essence of “post-capitalist society”. Drucker (1993) argues that, in the 
“knowledge society”, organizations have to build systematic practices for managing a self-
transformation. 
As such, the equilibrium-based methodology of the RBV fails to capture important dynamic
aspects such as knowledge creation, learning, and innovation (Seoudi, 2009; Spender, 1996). 
For example, the current conceptualization of the RBV fails to distinguish between: (1) 
knowledge integration (in the terminology of Grant (1996)) and knowledge creation (in the 
terminology of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)); (2) “exploitation of old certainties” and 
“exploration of new possibilities” (in the terminology of (March, 1991)); (3) “single-loop 
learning” and “double-loop learning” (in the terminology of Argyris (1999)), or “incremental 
learning” and “step function learning” (in the terminology of Helfat and Raubitschek (2000)). 
All have been argued to be essential characteristics of firms seeking to generate sustained 
competitive advantage. 
7. The absence of a chain of causality (Hierarchical schemata) 
As has been stated before, the VRIO framework classifies firm resources into four categories 
(capital, physical, human, organizational). Priem and Butler (2001a) describe this 
classification as “all-inclusive resources”. Sanchez (2008) argues that this “ad hoc listing” of 
firm resources “adds nothing that is theoretically relevant in the characterization and analysis 
of resources”. Similarly, while identifying some issues related to how to operationalise the 
RBV approach, Conner (1991) argues that consideration needs to be given to understanding 
the levels of resources that may exist within firms and to the potential contribution of each to 
performance differentials. This will help prevent everything in the firm from being labelled a 
resource and hence resources lose explanatory power. (Conner, 1991: 144-145) 
In addition, Madhavaram and Hunt (2008) argue that “classificational schemata are important 
for the development of theory, and hierarchical schemata are particularly important”. In 
addition, they state that the conceptualization of capability and competence should not only 
address what the concept is, but also where the concept comes from. In this regard, Sanchez 
(2008) argues that, because of lacking any adequate conceptual basis for constructing such 
chains of causality, “the core proposition of the RBV is simply theoretically unjustified, and 
the RBV provides no actual basis for enacting the core proposition in practice”. 
8. The asymmetry in assumptions regarding the strategic factor markets (SFMs) 
Many resource-based scholars recognize the work of Dierickx and Cool (1989a) as a 
significant theoretical contribution to the resource-based competition (e.g., Conner, 1991; 
Knott et al., 2003; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Peteraf, 1993; Priem and Butler, 2001a). 
The purpose of Dierickx and Cool’s work is threefold: (1) to discuss some of the limitations 
inherent in the concept of SFM, a key concept in which the VRIO framework is grounded; 
(2) to put forward a complementary framework based on the notion of asset stock 
accumulation; and (3) to develop guidelines for assessing the sustainability of a firm's 
competitive adbvantage. Of particular importance here is the strong debate they raise against 
the SFM concept. They argue that SFMs are “incomplete”, and “tradable assets” are not 
qualified to generate sustained competitive advantage. They question the assumption that all 
required assets by a firm can be bought and sold. They remind us that critical resources are 
accumulated rather than acquired, such as reputation for quality, dealer loyalty brand trust 
and R&D capability. Thus, ‘competitors who need an asset which is nontradable are 
constrained to ‘building’ it. . . . Clearly, the assumption that factor markets are complete may 
not be pushed too far (Dierickx and Cool, 1989a: 105-109). 
9. The accumulation of strategic resources (A black box) 
The second purpose of the Dierickx and Cool (1989a)’s work is to develop a process that 
takes into consideration the dynamic aspects of firm resources based on the notion of “asset 
stocks” and “asset flows”. Their argument is simply that strategic asset stocks are 
accumulated over a period of time by following a consistent set of policies. For example, 
Toyota has developed a reputation for build quality by investing over a long period in 
production, quality control and training. 
It is concluded from the debate between Barney (1989) and Dierickx and Cool (1989b) that 
the theoretical frameworks of the RBV (VRIN and VRIO) deliberately neglect the dynamic 
nature of strategic resources.  As a result, many scholars argue that the VRIN and VRIO do 
not explicitly deal with the complex processes by which firms can endogenously accumulate
and maintain all strategically valuable resources, namely that of intangible resources. 
Therefore, it does not address a critical challenge faced by practitioners while managing these 
resources, as the real source of competitive advantage (Priem and Butler, 2001a; Sanchez, 
2008; Sanchez and Heene, 1997a; Seoudi, 2009).  
In other words, a theory that draws solely on the SFM concept cannot take account of higher-
order resources, capabilities and competences (Dierickx and Cool, 1989a; Makadok, 2001; 
Sanchez, 2008). It is a “resource-picking theory”, rather than resource accumulating one 
(Makadok, 2001). Put differently, it is a theory that deals with “operand resources” rather 
than “operant resources” (in the terminology of Vargo and Lusch (2004)). While the former 
is important, the latter is the real source of competitive advantage (Dierickx and Cool, 1989a; 
Itami, 1987), especially that the degree of  inimitability and the number of potential paths to 
competitive advantage increases as one moves from tradable resources to nontradable
resources (Black and Boal, 1994). 
10. The synergetic effect of a bundle of resources (A black box) 
The third purpose of the Dierickx and Cool (1989a)’s work is to develop guidelines for 
assessing the sustainability of a firm's competitive advantage. They argue that the degree of 
imitablility of a particular asset stock is determined by “the interplay of a number of 
attributes” which may or may not characterize the process by which it may be accumulated. 
These are: “time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, interconnectedness of 
asset stocks, asset erosion, and causal [or linkage] ambiguity”. Of particular importance is the 
attribute of “interconnectedness of asset stocks”. 
This attribute shows that none of the resources of a firm are capable of creating value on their 
own, but must be interrelated and coordinated with other resources through coherent firm 
processes that are capable of creating and producing successful products and/or services for 
markets (Madhavaram and Hunt, 2008; Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1991; Sanchez, 2008; Spender, 
1994). Though, the VRIO framework treats resources as “singular distinct items rather than a 
bundle of resources” that gives a synergistic result (Black and Boal, 1994). It 
“characteristically overlooks the collective knowledge and skills required to coordinate the 
resources into a viable bundle. It overlooks, therefore, the synergistic aspects of the 
organization as a system of practice” (Spender, 1994: 353).  
This criticism is reinforced by Priem and Butler (2001a) who state that “the processes 
through which particular resources provide competitive advantage remain in a black box . . . . 
We do not know, for example, how the resources generate sustainable rents, other than 
through their heterogeneity. Why is it that some heterogeneous resources generate value, 
whereas other heterogeneous resources do not?” What should be noted here is that, as Black 
and Boal (1994) argue, the value created, the degree of inimitability achieved, and the 
number of potential paths to competitive advantage increase as one moves from a single 
resource to a bundle of resources.  
Although it is obvious from the discussion of the previous three criticisms (8, 9, and 10) that 
the resource-picking and capability-building mechanisms are complementary (and sometimes 
substitutes), the contribution of Dierickx and Cool (1989a) is unfortunately framed within the 
narrow focus of the VRIO theoretical framework. In other words, many scholars neglect: (1) 
the process by which strategic resources are accumulated and maintained; and (2) the way by 
which a bundle of resources is coordinated to give a synergistic result. By doing so, they 
neglect the dynamic nature of resource bundles. 
11. Unimplementable in practice 
Priem and Butler (2001a) argue that the VRIO framework is practicably unimplementable
because it does not develop “meaningful management tools in the form of actionable 
prescriptions for practitioners”. That is, a useful strategic management theory should provide 
prescriptions for both the independent variables (“Operational Validity”) and outcome 
variables. VRIO does not. The practioner is unable to implement the action implementations 
of the theory or to manipulate the key independent variables.  For example, precisely how is 
the practioner to go about obtaining rare and valuable resources that are hard to imitate and 
nonsubstitutable (Priem and Butler, 2001a: 31-32). 
12. The epistemological impossibility problem 
Despite the previous criticisms, Sanchez (2008) argues that a scientific critique of the VRIO 
framework as a testable theory reveals the “epistemological impossibility problem”. That is, 
the core proposition of the VRIO framework does not allow for “reproducibility of 
experiments”, “falsifiability”, and “generalizability”.  
Regarding the reproducibility of experiments: 
Given that the core proposition of the RBV is that competitive advantage is a symptom of 
unique resources (firm heterogeneity) it is extremely difficult if not impossible to 
reproduce research conducted in one firm by finding a similar context in another 
(Sanchez, 2008: 29). 
Regarding the falsifiability:
Given the broad notion of resources in the RBV it is always possible to identify a 
heterogeneous resource in a successful firm that can be argued to be the source of that 
firm’s success. If to this we add the difficulty of recreating experiments in other firms, it is 
impossible to definitively reject the proposition that certain kinds of resources are the 
source of a firm’s success (Sanchez, 2008: 29). 
Regarding the generalizability:
Given the RBV’s basic claim that a given firm’s competitive success is the result of the 
firm’s heterogeneous endowment of resources, this precludes any possibility of 
performing confirming experiments involving other firms that would be needed to support 
a generalized proposition, because other firms would have to have their own 
“heterogeneous” resource endowments (Sanchez, 2008: 29). 
13. One framework for different competitive contexts 
Priem and Butler (2001a), Sanchez (2008), and Bowman and Collier (2006) criticize the level 
of generality the VRIO framework claims, and argue for developing “contingency 
approaches” or “middle-range strategy theories” that identify the competitive contexts within 
which these approaches are expected to hold8. That is, it is critical to establish boundaries for 
the framework by hypothesizing competitive contexts within which particular capabilities or 
competences are determined to be more or less valuable.   
Sanchez (2008) argues that the competitive environments of firms may be fundamentally 
different in nature, and may span a spectrum from “stable (seen largely as a special case) to 
highly dynamic (regarded as an increasingly common if not dominant context)”. Therefore, a 
“grand strategy theory” of universally applicable characterizations and derived prescriptions 
must take into consideration the qualitatively different kinds of competitive contexts. This 
leads to a further limitation. To take account of different competitive contexts and to develop 
universally applicable propositions may require such a high level of abstraction that they may 
lose any capacity for effectively addressing the specific conditions that distinguish 
qualitatively different competitive contexts (Sanchez, 2008: 49).
The level of empirical support of the RBV 
Newbert (2007) conducts the first “systematic assessment of the RBV’s level of empirical 
support”. That is a sample of “RBV-grounded empirical articles”, undertaken between 1994 
and 2005, is analyzed in which four theoretical approaches are employed: (1) the “resource 
heterogeneity approach” (the VRIN framework); (2) the “organizing approach” (the VRIO 
framework); (3) the “conceptual-level approach”; and (4) the “dynamic capabilities 
approach”9. The analysis shows that 91% of the total sample employs the resource 
heterogeneity approach. In this approach, the scholars argue on theoretical grounds that a 
given resource, capability, or core competence is valuable, rare, inimitable, and/or non-
substitutable, quantify the amount of it possessed by a firm, and correlate this amount to 
some measure of competitive advantage or performance. The results show that while 
capabilities and core competencies do indeed contribute significantly to a firm’s competitive 
advantage and/or performance, resources do not.  
This is not surprising given that much of the foundational work on the RBV addresses the 
importance of deploying and not simply possessing resources. The more recent studies have  . 
. . attempted to more precisely explain these processes.  Newbert (2007) argues that future 
research should focus on the more contemporary theoretical extensions of RBV. Furthermore, 
Armstrong and Shimizu (2007) have suggested state that RBV research is at the stage of 
“interim struggles” (Weick, 1995: 385) through which the RBV can advance by further 
interaction between theoretical refinement and empirical development. 
Conclusions 
Our starting point for this study is a recognition that the field of research on resource based 
competition is full of nuanced terminology and misunderstandings. Of course, this partly 
reflects the intense interest and lively debate within the management research community, but 
it does nonetheless present difficulties for scholars attempting to begin research in the field. 
Furthermore, we also recognise that within this paradigm there exists a dominant theoretical 
framework- VIRO that we wished to examine. To address this two conceptual tasks have 
been undertaken here in this paper. 
First, this analysis structured the literature on resources-based competition into three distinct 
schools of thought. In doing this, we contribute to management research in two areas: i) to 
help the reader witness the deviation among the three schools of thought; ii) to help 
researchers work through the wide terminological confusion and situate their work within the 
relevant school of thought. Thus scholars should be aware of the basic organizational 
assumptions and interpretations that shape the three schools of thought. For example, those 
who are interested in specific phenomena, like radical innovations, are advised to adopt 
theories and approaches developed under the social constructionist school. Scholars who are 
interested in incremental innovations, on the other hand, are advised to adopt theories and 
approaches developed under the behavioural-evolutionary school.     
Second, this study sought to draw together the criticisms that have emerged since Jay Barney 
wrote his widely known articles: “Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business 
strategy” (Barney, 1986); and “Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage” 
(Barney, 1991). Although much has been written on the subject in this time, very few have 
attempted to systematically draw together the criticisms that have emerged. This is 
particularly important as “major proponents of the RBV have been remarkably silent and 
occasionally evasive in responding to fundamental conceptual and theoretical criticisms” 
(Sanchez, 2008). Based on the thirteen criticisms and the low level of empirical support 
discussed above, we can conclude that the VRIO does not adequately address the notion of 
resource-based competition, and its claim to be a general view of resources is unwarranted 
theoretically and unsupported empirically. In other words, the generic attributes of rent-
generating resources (value, rare, imperfect imitability, and organization) should not be used 
to assess the sustainability of competitive advantage when the real source of this advantage is 
capabilities and competences. In this context, the other views (the dynamic capability- and 
competence-based views) have recognized that capabilities and competences in using 
resources are conceptually distinct from other kinds of firm resources. This has led to the 
identification of completely different attributes of rent-generating capabilities and 
competences (e.g., time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, 
interconnectedness of asset stocks, asset erosion, and/or or linkage ambiguity). We therefore 
suggest that researchers avoid the tendency to test a theoretical framework reflecting 
resource-picking mechanism when the real source of competitive success are capabilities and 
competences, which, unsurprisingly enjoy a high level of empirical support. 
The extensive attention granted to the RBV may be explained by one or more of the 
following. First, “the relative ease of measuring resources as compared to (dynamic) 
capabilities and (core) competencies”. Second, the theoretical framework of the RBV is 
widely regarded as “the first formalization of the then-fragmented resource-based literature 
into a comprehensive (and thus) empirically testable theoretical framework” (Newbert, 2007), 
taking into consideration the nature of the early versions of the alternative views 
(practitioner-oriented and diversification-emphasized: e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Third, “the management-fashion-setting process” may also explain why some scholars have 
elevated it from a view to theory (Abrahamson, 1996). Fourth, neglecting (and, and in some 
cases, misinterpreting) the classic scholary work (e.g., Penrose (1959) and Dierickx and Cool 
(1989a)) may also explain why the VRIO framework has been elevated from a view (within 
this paradigm) to a theory (codifing the whole paradigm), and why it has receievd so much 
attention. 
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Notes 
1. In this paradigm, strategy may be known as “industry-based strategy”. The structure of this paradigm may be 
presented in the following three levels. First, strategy should focus on choosing an attractive industry and/or 
altering the structure of the chosen industry to increase monopoly power. In this regard, the profitability of a 
firm in an industry is determined by the five competitive forces identified by Porter (1980). Second, after 
choosing an attractive industry or altering the industry structure, the firm should choose among the three 
generic strategies. In this regard, the firm “must make a choice among them, or it will become stuck in the 
middle”. Third, internal factors come into play after choosing one of the three generic strategies. That is, the 
firm should manage well the activities in its “value chain”, which are considered as the basic unit in 
competitive advantage (Hunt and Derozier, 2004). In this regard, the “value chain” analysis is considered as 
an “accepted” alternative for both the RBV and the (SW) of SWOT analysis (Priem and Butler, 2001b). 
2. The active creator of environment is more akin to the “Prospector” (in the terminology of Miles et al. (1978)) 
and the “enacting organization” (in the terminology of Daft and Weick (1984)).    
3. In 1994, the work of Wernerfelt (1984), A resource-based view of the firm, was awarded annual prize for the 
“best paper” published in the Strategic Management Journal five or more years prior (Wernerfelt, 1995). 
4. Barney (1986) introduces the concept of strategic factor markets to: (1) show that all strategic factors required 
to implement strategies can be traded in these markets; (2) argue that both the costs of the strategic factors 
required to implement strategies and the future returns expected from these strategies should be taken into 
consideration; (3) argue that a firm can generate above-normal economic performance if it is able to create 
imperfection in the strategic factor market; (4) argue that a firm can “become consistently better informed 
about the value of strategies they are implementing than other firms” (“systematic expectional advantage”) by 
“turning inwardly” to analyze its resources and capabilities;  and (5) conclude that “the search for CA and 
superior financial performance must begin with an analysis of the resources and capabilities a firm currently 
control”. 
5. Resources that do not enable a firm to conceive of and/or implement strategies that improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness or that have no impact on the firm’s strategizing processes are considered worthless resources 
(Barney, 1991). 
6. Sanchez (2008: 1-2) “applies the principles of the philosophy of science and the derived scientific method to 
analyze the foundational concepts and core proposition of the RBV” (both the VRIN and VRIO) framework, 
and identifies “seven fundamental conceptual deficiencies and logic problems”. 
7. The book was first published in the USA in 1942. 
8. This notion can be easily seen in the work of Miles et al. (1978). They develop a typology for organizational 
strategies according to three “product-market domains”. That is, the prospector strategy is more relevant for 
the domain that is broad and in a continuous state of development; the defender strategy is more relevant to 
the domain that is narrow and stable; and the analyzer strategy is more relevant to the hybrid domain. 
9. The first two approaches seek to identify the actual resource and capability that confer an advantage to a firm. 
The third approach seeks to test whether the attributes (valuable, rare, inimitable), as essential for a resource 
to effectively contribute to a firm’s advantage, are indeed significant predictors to this end. The last approach 
seeks to test the effect of the interaction of a specific resource (that has the four attributes of the VRIN or the 
VRIO) and a dynamic capability on a firm’s advantage. 
